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On the necessity of intertwining ‘knowledge 
in practice’ in action research 
Nina Bonderup Dohn 
 
The aim of this article is to clarify the ontology of knowledge, and to point 
out methodological implications hereof for action research aimed at action 
researchers’ and practitioners’ co-creation of knowledge. The article is 
motivated by the observation that action research literature tends to either 
unwittingly subsume all forms of knowledge under propositional 
knowledge, or alternatively to differentiate knowledge forms to the point 
of non-relatedness. Knowledge is analysed as an action-oriented perspec-
tive: ‘knowledge in practice’, consisting of a holistic unity of personal ex-
perience, practical knowing, and propositional knowledge. The analysis 
points out a serious quality issue: Intertwining of practitioner and re-
searcher ‘knowledge in practice’ is necessary to allow adequate develop-
ment and evaluation of action research projects. Three paradigmatic forms 
of collaboration are considered: ‘division of labour’, ‘mutual apprentice-
ship’, and ‘co-operative inquiry’. ‘Mutual apprenticeship’ is argued to 
meet the quality issue best. 
Key words: knowledge in practice, action research, co-inquiry, quality, 
tacit knowledge methodology, epistemology 
 
Vignette 
Here we sit again: My fellow action researcher and I together with the three 
primary participants from the company, i.e. the two IT experts teaching the 
course that our project focuses on, and a representative from the human 
resource department. The project is about developing and implementing an e-
 On the necessity of intertwining ‘knowledge in practice’ in action research 55 
  
 
learning course on a new IT-system to be implemented in the company. We 
have agreed to centre the course on the real life working problems of the 
course participants, i.e. structure the course content in terms of these prob-
lems, and use the e-learning sessions as ‘reflective spaces’ for discussion. We 
have been working together for around a year (not counting the half a year 
we spent getting the project group together), having workshops, doing a pilot 
study with a prior course, getting to know each other’s practices. Today, we 
are going to discuss some details about the pedagogy of the concrete learn-
ing activities in some of the sessions. Or so I thought. But I am to be told 
differently: One of the participants tells us that they have decided to stop the 
project, and go back to traditional classroom courses with lectures and 
exercises. The reasons given are that it will save time and be more managea-
ble for the teacher. End of action research project. 
I am frustrated, as is my fellow action researcher. We don’t understand: 
we thought that the whole project group had negotiated a common under-
standing, based on the discussion of learning and teaching experiences of all 
the participants, as well as on learning theoretical arguments from the action 
researchers, that a teacher-centred course removed from practice has less 
chances of motivating course participants, and has problems of relevance 
and ‘knowledge transfer’ as compared to a course taking place in practice 
and centring on actual problems here. The existence of this common under-
standing had been corroborated, we thought, during the pilot study and in the 
course of getting to know each other’s practices. We really thought we all 
‘knew’ this. Obviously, time is an important issue for a company, along with 
other resources, and a course must be ‘manageable’ for the teacher. I and my 
fellow action researcher ‘know’ this (we think). Still, we would argue (we 
did) that saving time and making it easier for the teacher here and now is of 
limited value in the long run, if course participants cannot transform course 
content into useful knowledge in their practice afterwards. 
Somehow communication has broken down. Action researchers and com-
pany participants do not seem to be seeing the same scene; we disagree 
about the way aspects like time, relevance for practice, manageability, 
learning etc. are interrelated, including in which ways they necessarily 
structure each other, and in which ways we can influence their structuring 
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each other. We also disagree on what counts as ‘an aspect’ and what does 
not. Is ‘ownership over the course for the course participants’ an aspect in its 
own right, or isn’t it? Maybe we wouldn’t even agree about when course 
participants have learned what the course intended they learn, partly because 
we probably, despite all the agreeing on explicitly formulated course objec-
tives, still view this ‘what’ differently, including being in disagreement on the 
question whether it ‘is’ a ‘what’ at all, or rather is a situated construction 
transformed in its very use. And partly because we would most likely see the 
practice of the course participants after the course in incommensurate ways, 
leading to different answers to the question of whether they ‘use what they 
have learned’ afterwards. 
1.  Introduction – the need for further analysis of forms of knowledge 
and their relation to each other 
I start the article with a vignette. The purpose is to ‘set the scene’ and offer an 
illustrative exemplar for the main thrust of the article, which is a theoretical 
discussion of the importance of tacit dimensions of knowledge, and of the 
resulting necessity of intertwining researcher and practitioner ‘knowledge in 
practice’ in action research. The vignette does not constitute an empirical 
case study in any strict sense: rather it is an example of a breakdown in 
communication and understanding which I have experienced myself, and 
which provides a phenomenological basis for the philosophical analysis to be 
presented. At the same time, as will be argued more extensively below, cases 
reported in the literature match ours closely, as concerns the problems of 
communication and understanding and the reasons why they evolved (Olesen 
& Nordentoft, 2013; Pedersen & Olesen, 2008). This goes to indicate that the 
empirical base correlating with the philosophical analysis is indeed not 
negligible.  
The claim that tacit dimensions of knowledge are important will probably 
not initially meet extensive resistance within the field of action research. 
Seemingly, the view is widely accepted that there are more forms or aspects 
of knowledge than propositional or representational knowledge. Thus, Heron 
& Reason e.g. maintain that “the propositional knowledge of academia” in 
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action research must be extended to encompass three other forms of human 
knowing, i.e. experiential, presentational, and practical knowing (Heron & 
Reason, 2001, p. 183). Marshall similarly emphasises that she works with “a 
multi-dimensional frame of knowing; acknowledging and connecting be-
tween intellectual, emotional, practical, intuitive, sensory, imaginal and more 
knowings.” (Marshall, 2001, p. 433). Other authors speak of “multiple ways 
of knowing”(Poonamallee, 2009, p. 71-72), “local situated knowledge” 
(Genat, 2009, p. 106), “experiential knowledge” (Olesen & Nordentoft, 2013, 
p. 78; Pedersen & Olesen, 2008, p. 16; Riemann, 2011, p. 274)1, “context-
sensitive knowledge” (Olesen & Nordentoft, 2013, p. 79), “involved” and 
“personal” knowledge (Johnsen, 2010, p. 70), “embodied” and “practical” 
knowledge (Pedersen & Olesen, 2008, p. 3, 16, respectively), “knowing 
engagement” (Schaenen, Kohnen, Flinn, Saul, & Zeni, 2012, p. 80) and 
“actionable knowledge” (Gustavsen, 2004; Shotter, 2004). More generally, 
the view of Lewin, accepted by most action researchers, that only through 
changing an organisation will we come to understand it (Lewin, 1973), 
arguably implies that involving oneself practically in the world gives another 
‘deeper’ kind of knowledge than the one expressible in words. 
However, upon a closer look, few authors expand on what constitutes 
these different forms of knowledge, on their ontology, ‘what they are made 
up of’, and how they are ‘had’ or ‘held’ or ‘enacted’ by knowers. Further-
more, even if they explicitly acknowledge different forms of knowledge, 
many authors in practice implicitly take for granted that these other forms of 
knowledge can all be put into words. For example, Pedersen and Olesen 
argue that “open communication” is necessary if collaboration between 
participants with their “theoretical, experiential, and practical knowledge” is 
to succeed (Pedersen & Olesen, 2008, p. 16). Whilst it is hard to disagree that 
‘open communication’ is indeed supportive of collaboration, it is only deci-
sive on the presupposition that the experiential and practical knowledge can 
be articulated in words in the communication. Shotter claims that ”withness 
(dialogic) -talk” (p. 205) in the vein of ”1st person tellings” (p. 219) may 
                                           
1  Pagenumbers for the article by Pedersen & Olesen refer throughout to the version of 
the article available through the journal’s online publication (accessed through WISO). 
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“enable… us to enter into another’s world, and to get a sense of a ‘some-
thing’ with a life of its own” (p. 221, italics in original); because such tellings 
may ”’move’ listeners into paying attention to previously unnoticed particu-
larities within the ’world’ of the insiders… although the cases described 
might seem to be utterly unique and particular, they can in their telling give 
rise, nonetheless, to transferrable or actionable knowledge” (p. 219) (Shotter, 
2004). Genat equates “local situated knowledge” with ”local theory” (p. 106) 
established in participant focus group discussions aimed at ”foreground[ing] 
shared local understandings” (p. 101) (Genat, 2009). The “experiential 
knowledge” emphasized by Riemann and by Olesen and Nordentoft is only 
made available to them verbally, in the writings of his students in Riemann’s 
case and in dialogue sessions in Olesen’s and Nordentoft’s (Olesen & 
Nordentoft, 2013; Riemann, 2011). Neither comment on this point, thereby 
indicating that they do not see lack of ‘direct’ non-verbal access to the al-
leged ‘experiential knowledge’ as a problem. Johnsen argues that “there are 
limits to what level of personal knowledge that social science should strive 
at” because only “part of that knowledge [the knowledge involvement gives 
us] is relevant outside the lifeworld situation.” Further, the part that is rele-
vant is the one that “produces social rather than individual lifeworld 
knowledge” where “social knowledge has taken the lifeworld knowledge of 
the other at least one step in direction of structuring, classifying and objecti-
fying”(Johnsen, 2010, p. 70). The implication, it would seem, is that the 
social lifeworld knowledge at least, and thereby what is of scientific signifi-
cance according to Johnsen, is linguistically expressible, as this is a precondi-
tion of the processes of structuring, classifying and objectifying.  
In sum, such authors are in different ways effectively treating allegedly 
different knowledge forms as at least convertible into propositional 
knowledge. Moreover, the so-converted propositional knowledge is implicitly 
(or explicitly, Shotter, 2004) supposed to be understandable for all who hear 
it expressed, no matter whether they held the original non-converted ‘other 
knowledge form’ themselves or not. In other words, though non-propositional 
knowledge forms are explicitly acknowledged, the underlying contradictory 
premise is that no essential element is lost by converting the non-
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propositional forms into propositional ones. In effect, the premise is that all 
knowledge is fundamentally expressible. 
In stark contrast to this tendency to neglect in practice the significance of 
non-propositional knowledge, a few authors, such as Eikeland and Park, 
supply elaborate characterisations of different forms of knowledge, described 
as more or less unrelated to each other. Park, inspired by Habermas, thus 
distinguishes three forms of knowledge, all pursued in action research, but 
not reducible to each other: representational, relational, and reflective 
knowledge, of which only the first is propositional, whereas the second is 
affective, “we know with feeling, and the knowing is in the feeling” (Park, 
2001, p. 85), and the third is “social and dialogic”, integrally connected with 
action (ibid, p. 86). In a recent article, Eikeland, for his part following Aristo-
tle, has distinguished seven different ways of knowing which he claims are 
relatively distinct and unrelated because they are grounded in different rela-
tionships between knower and known, including different ways in which 
action as means and/or end is of significance to knowing (Eikeland, 2012). 
He does argue that one way of knowing (praxis1, ‘practice’ in English) is in a 
sense basic to the others because each ‘way’ has its own habitus (Bourdieu, 
1977, 1990) : its own manner of going about the world and making sense of 
it, i.e. its own praxis1, connected to it and that especially theoria (English 
‘insight’), aimed at articulating the ‘grammar’ of praxis1, only comes about 
through dialogue about praxis1. 
In this sense, Eikeland does claim that some kind of one-to-one connec-
tion exists between one particular way of knowing (praxis1) and the other 
ones. This corresponds to his claim in an earlier article that the outset for the 
development of propositional knowledge is the “habits, standards of compe-
tence, language, tradition, norms and ways of doing-things” (Eikeland, 2006, 
p. 209), i.e. the practical knowledge and competence we always already have 
as human beings in a world. I fully agree with this point. However, Eikeland 
does not expand on how propositional knowledge is developed out of praxis1, 
i.e. on the way in which praxis1 contributes with meaning to the propositional 
knowledge. Further, his analysis does not convey any direct connections 
between the various other ways of knowing than praxis1 so that they would 
all seem to be only related to each other, if at all, through their grounding in 
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the latter. Moreover, since the relationship between praxis1 and the other 
ways of knowing (apart perhaps from theoria) is one of form rather than 
content: it concerns the manner in which one relates oneself as knower to 
known, rather than the actual knowing itself , it is hard to see how knowledge 
created through other ways of knowing might contribute to the content of 
propositional knowledge for the person in question. It is e.g. hard to see how 
the experience of hammering might contribute to one’s understanding of 
propositional knowledge about appropriate weight distributions in hammers. 
In sum, Eikeland’s focus (Eikeland, 2012) on distinguishing different ways of 
knowing, and setting them apart from one another, renders it somewhat 
obscure how tacit and explicit aspects of knowledge relate for the knower.  
In general, characterisations such as Park’s and Eikeland’s (2012), which 
are concerned with distinguishing different forms of knowledge may easily 
mislead readers into thinking that these different forms exist in more or less 
isolation from one another. This is unfortunate because it suggests a com-
partmentalisation of knowledge in the ‘knower’ which, on the face of it, is in 
poor agreement with our everyday experience as active knowers in the world. 
The upshot of this somewhat lengthy introduction is that though there is 
widespread acceptance of the claim that there exist more knowledge forms 
than the propositional one, the ontology of the different alleged forms of 
knowledge and their relationship to one another is at best unclear. The 
tendencies are to either subsume all forms under the propositional one in 
actual argumentative practice, or on the contrary to distinguish them so much 
from one another that they might seem not to be related at all. These tenden-
cies are problematic, not just for philosophical reasons, but because an inade-
quate understanding of what knowledge is may well result in an inadequate 
research practice. If the tacit dimensions of knowledge are in practice treated 
as if they were propositionally expressible, measures will not be taken to 
ensure that they are investigated as tacit dimensions. This is seen clearly in 
the literature referred to above, where researchers seek to disclose practition-
ers’ experiential and practical knowledge solely through dialogue. If on the 
other hand, the relationship between different forms of knowledge is disre-
garded, no measures will be taken to ensure that the researcher seeks to 
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disclose them in their interrelation: to find out whether and how they might 
actually supply meaning to one another. 
In this article I contribute to the clarification of these issues by providing 
an analysis of knowledge as an action-oriented perspective, anchored in the 
practical doings of the agent and significantly involving tacit dimensions. My 
analysis will show the action-oriented perspective, which I term ‘knowledge 
in practice’, to be a holistic unity of propositional, experiential, and practical 
aspects where the latter two types constitute a tacit resonance field of mean-
ing which supplies semantic content to linguistically articulated knowledge 
(the propositional aspect). On the basis of my analysis, a serious quality issue 
shows up as potentially present in very many action research projects con-
cerned with action researchers’ and practitioners’ co-creation of knowledge: 
The action researchers actually do not have enough experience-based 
‘knowledge in practice’ within the practical domain of their research, within 
what I will call the ‘action practice’ in distinction to the researcher’s ‘re-
search practice’, to understand what they are doing or know what they are 
saying. There is risk of significant misunderstandings between researcher and 
practitioner, and there are serious methodological problems concerning the 
evolvement and evaluation of the action research project. This quality issue at 
once echoes, aggravates, and provides a slightly different grounding for the 
validity issue pointed out by Eikeland that “practical personal experience” at 
the centre of research is necessary to answer Geertz’ validity-question: 
““How can you tell a better account from a worse one”? and “what basis do 
we have for our interpretation”?” (Eikeland, 2006, pp. 210, 203; Geertz, 
1973, p. 16, italics in original). 
Returning to the vignette in the beginning of the article, it constitutes a 
concrete problematic case of action research where we as action researchers 
did not have the necessary ‘knowledge in practice’ within the action practice, 
nor did the practitioners have the necessary research ‘knowledge in practice’. 
Of course, not all action research projects fail like ours, nor do all action 
researchers act and think as naïvely as we (or the caricature presented of us) 
did; the distribution of research roles between action researchers and compa-
ny participants may well differ quite substantially from the distribution in 
other cases, and the mistakes made by project group members on both sides 
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hopefully are not made in all action research projects. The claim is not that 
the vignette is representative of action research in general. The claim, howev-
er, is that the failure in this concrete case, to a large extent, can be ascribed to 
problems and tensions that underlie much action research, though fortunately 
they do not always have as dire consequences. In other words, the case has 
been chosen because its failure highlights common issues. 
The structure of the article is as follows: In the next section I argue for my 
view of knowledge as ‘knowledge in practice’. In section 3, I look at the 
methodological implications of this view for action research. The point here 
is that practitioners and researchers at the beginning of an action research 
project bring very different kinds of ‘knowledge in practice’ into their collab-
oration, which, of course, is the very reason for initiating a co-inquiry, but 
which, if due consideration is not given to the divergent tacit dimensions of 
the participants’ ‘knowledge in practice’, will result in methodological prob-
lems. Different forms of collaboration in action research have different 
chances of countering these problems. Three different forms of collaboration 
are considered (section 4): the ‘division of labour’ approach of for example 
Genat (Genat, 2009), in which the roles of the action researchers are com-
plementary to the ones of the practitioners; the ‘mutual apprenticeship’ 
approach argued for by Eikeland (Eikeland, 2006); and the co-operative 
inquiry of Heron and Reason (Heron & Reason, 2001). In conclusion (section 
5), Eikeland’s approach is claimed to be the one that meets the problem of 
‘knowledge in practice’ best, though it has methodological and organisational 
problems of its own. The case presented in the vignette serves throughout the 
article to illustrate and elaborate the theoretical points.  
2.  The ‘knowledge in practice’ of the practitioner 
In this section, I shall present my view of knowledge as a fundamentally tacit 
and action-oriented perspective, a ‘knowledge in practice’, which is grounded 
in our everyday ways of going about the world and each other, but in which 
propositional knowledge is incorporated as an integral aspect of the perspec-
tive. The view is inspired by Wittgenstein, especially in his Scandinavian 
interpretation (Johannessen, 1988, 1992; Johannessen & Rolf, 1989; 
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Josefson, 1998; Molander, 1992, 1996; Nordenstam, 1983), as well as by 
insights from phenomenology, especially Merleau-Ponty and Dreyfus 
(Dreyfus, 1979; Merleau-Ponty, 1962), and situated learning (Greeno, 1997; 
Lave, 1988; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Packer, 2001; Packer & Goicoechea, 
2000), cf. also (Dohn, 2005, 2011, 2013; Dohn & Kjær, 2009). I shall focus 
first on the characterisation of the ‘experiential’ and the ‘practical’ aspects of 
knowledge as distinct from the propositional one (in order to ‘fill in the 
details’ in comparison with the abovementioned literature which ends up 
unwittingly prioritising propositional knowledge). Here, I shall give a few 
examples of ‘personal experience’ (the experiential aspect) and ‘practical 
knowing’ (the practical aspect). Second, I shall then discuss how they interre-
late with each other and with propositional knowledge to form a holistic 
unity, ‘knowledge in practice’ (in order not to end up compartmentalising the 
forms of knowledge). 
2.1 The experiential aspect 
A simple, first, example of what I term ‘personal experience’ is Wittgen-
stein’s: “wissen… wie eine Klarinette klingt” (Wittgenstein, 1958, §78). This 
type of knowledge is a “knowledge by acquaintance” (Russell, 1912), i.e. a 
form of knowledge which can only be acquired by ‘meeting’ the phenomena 
in question directly and thereby experiencing it oneself. Other, equally sim-
ple, examples of ‘personal experience’ are ‘knowing what mauve looks like’, 
‘knowing what kangaroo tastes like’. Personal experience is tacit in the sense 
that one cannot explain e.g. what the clarinet sounds like to someone who has 
never heard anything like it before. Despite the many categories which 
Eikeland, following Aristotle, distinguishes, he does not explicitly consider 
this one. He only indirectly acknowledges it in connection with what he calls 
praxis1 when he talks of “practically acquired empeiria (=Erfahrung as 
accumulated practical experience exercised/habituated into us…)”(Eikeland, 
2012, p. 24). However, on this rendering no distinction is drawn, as I do, 
between personal experience and practical knowing (cf. below). 
Some philosophers (Block, 1990; Jackson, 1982; Nagel, 1974; Peacocke, 
1983) have described this ‘what it sounds/feels/looks like’ as the ‘phenome-
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nal quality’ of an experience, understood as a specific mental state. They 
refer to the ‘phenomenal quality’ with the technical term a quale (plural: 
qualia). There are several problems with this approach to experiential 
knowledge. For one thing, there is the problem of flexibility: Clarinet sounds 
vary, and putting experiential knowledge of ‘how it sounds’ down to one 
specific mental state does not do justice to our capacity to recognise the 
sound, despite variations in timbre, pitch, and melody. For another, qualia in 
the analysis of philosophers tend to fall out as epiphenomena, where the 
actual causal power is ascribed to the physical state in the brain which causes 
the quale (the so-called neural correlate of the quale) (Noë & Thompson, 
2004). Thirdly, qualia risk discursive epiphenomenality, too, in the way 
Wittgenstein pointed out in his famous beetle-in-a-box analogy 
(Wittgenstein, 1958, §293): Subjective mental ‘objects’, as qualia are most 
often construed, inherently private, i.e. inaccessible to others, fall out of 
discourse as something to which we cannot refer and which has no signifi-
cance. Arguably, these three problems with the qualia-interpretation all stem 
from the objectification involved in construing experiential knowledge as a 
mental state.  
More promising, I think, is the view that experiential knowledge of a phe-
nomenon is a felt holistic bodily responsiveness to it, a felt responsiveness 
which may involve one or more mental states but is not reducible to these 
states, because it is encoded more generally in the body’s handling of the 
situation in which the phenomenon is met. In the words of Dreyfus: “…my 
memories are inscribed in the things around me… My memories are stored in 
the familiar look of a chair or the threatening air of a street corner where I 
was once hurt.” (Dreyfus, 1979, p. 266) That this is so is perhaps seen most 
easily if one considers less simple examples such as ‘knowing what it is like 
to be addicted to smoking’, ‘knowing what it is like to survive cancer’ or 
‘knowing what it is like to become a mother for the first time’. The experien-
tial knowledge involved in each of these cases cannot be reduced to a simple 
sum of mental states. In the latter case, for example, the complex mixture of 
being joyously proud, overwhelmed by responsibility, fatigued beyond 
sensible thinking, self-sacrificial and yet self-assertive is not just so many 
different mental states combined. Rather, it is a multifaceted feeling residing 
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in the body as a whole which, when conjured up at later stages of life, shows 
itself in remembrance just as much in bodily sensations of e.g. happiness and 
drowsiness as in mental recollections. 
Personal experience, I said, is tacit in the sense that “one cannot explain 
e.g. what the clarinet sounds like to someone who has never heard anything 
like it before”. However, to someone who has heard ‘something like it’ one 
can to some extent explain the sound by referring to this other phenomenon 
with which the person is acquainted. One might perhaps explain that the 
clarinet sounds something like an oboe, but with a more ‘barrel-like’ timbre, 
like the oboe would sound if played in a tunnel. The point is that this expla-
nation will only be helpful to the person who knows what the oboe sounds 
like, and how making a sound in a tunnel changes timbre. It will not give the 
person who has never heard a musical instrument played, much less the 
person born deaf, any hint at what to imagine. They will be left only with the 
propositional knowledge that “a clarinet sounds like…”, but without any real 
semantic content to conjure up to fill in the words. And this is precisely 
because they, for lack of former experience with musical instruments (or 
sounds at all), lack the bodily responsiveness upon which others draw in their 
understanding of the propositional knowledge. Similarly, stating that “Mauve 
is more grey and more blue than a pale tint of magenta would be” (Wikipe-
dia, accessed 30.04.14) is only informative if you know the colours grey, 
blue, and magenta. To the colour-blind the sentence makes very little con-
crete sense (though he or she will of course understand the general point of 
the sentence which is to describe an unknown phenomenon via relating it to 
known phenomena). 
Finally, my description above of the multifaceted experience of ‘becom-
ing a mother for the first time’ makes much deeper sense to the woman (and 
man) who has children of her (his) own than to someone without children. As 
somewhat anecdotal evidence for this claim stands my experience from many 
years of teaching within the field of ‘tacit knowledge’: When I tell the stu-
dents a story about a woman who was set off in a fit of rage by the prospect 
of losing ten minutes of sleep, students without children find the woman 
hysterical, they definitely cannot understand her, whereas students (men and 
women alike) with children smile somewhat self-ironically because they 
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‘know exactly how she felt’ even if they agree that she overreacted. The very 
fact that they react so differently show the students that there is indeed a case 
of tacit, experiential knowledge at play here. In the same vein, Poonamallee 
notes that giving birth to and nurturing her first child during her data analysis 
stage helped her make experiential sense of the theoretical category 
‘dailiness’ (which she has from Long) and, in general, to understand her data 
on vision and long-term intergenerational commitment (Long, 1999; 
Poonamallee, 2009, p. 78). 
Stressing that experiential knowledge is tacit, and cannot be reduced to 
propositional knowledge, therefore does not mean that it is has no semantic 
content or is totally unrelated to propositional knowledge, or even that it 
cannot be communicated at all. On the contrary, personal experiences togeth-
er with practical knowing (to which I return below) make up a tacit resonance 
field of meaning which one draws upon in understanding the words of propo-
sitional knowledge. The tacit semantic content thus ‘resonates’ in one’s 
understanding, giving the words a significance-rich meaning. When one 
communicates with other people who have had similar experiences, their 
words may ‘call up’ one’s experiences, ‘draw them in’ and let them ‘resonate 
in’ one’s appreciation of what they are saying. In this sense, the experiences 
play an important part in making a conversation meaningful and ‘deep’. On 
the other hand, when communicating with people who lack such experience 
one will not be able to communicate the experiential and practical aspects to 
them, since they do not have the relevant resonance field of meaning, but 
only have the words. Conversations in such cases will often be experienced as 
‘shallow’ or as ‘not getting to the heart of the matter’. In this sense, the 
experiences are tacit: One cannot communicate them to anyone, but one can 
communicate about them and with them to people who share them. Experien-
tial knowledge is thus a form of knowledge distinct from and not reducible to 
propositional knowledge (in contrast to the way it is treated in practice in the 
literature referenced above), but with a bearing on the latter (in contrast to the 
opposite tendency, i.e. to dissociate forms of knowledge completely from one 
another).  
 On the necessity of intertwining ‘knowledge in practice’ in action research 67 
  
 
2.2 The practical aspect 
‘Practical knowing’ is the form of knowledge involved in exercising a skill: 
the ‘knowing how’ as opposed to the ‘knowing that’, which Ryle famously 
analysed (Ryle, 1949). Examples include as diverse phenomena as riding a 
bicycle, driving a car, playing the clarinet, discerning indicators of illnesses 
on X-ray pictures, solving math equations, speaking a language. What is 
common to these diverse examples is that ‘the knowing is in the doing’ and 
that a ‘practice’ is involved, a discernible holistic pattern in one’s interaction 
with the world. ‘Practical knowing’ is involved in the categories of khresis 
and praxis2 described by Eikeland, as well as in praxis1 (cf. above) (Eikeland, 
2012). According to Dreyfus & Dreyfus exercising a skill (at least when one 
is an expert at it) is constituted by “involved coping” where the agent is fully 
taken up with the situation and responds immediately to the demands and 
possibilities it poses. This is done, according to Dreyfus and Dreyfus, through 
holistic pattern (gestalt) recognition, where the agent responds immediately 
and intuitively to new situations in a “holistic pairing of new situations with 
associated responses produced by successful experiences in similar situa-
tions” (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 35) without representational awareness 
neither of actions, body, or skill nor even of the holistic pairing itself. Simi-
larly, Wittgenstein (on the Scandinavian reading of him to which I adhere) 
stressed that knowing “how to go on” in exercising e.g. the skill of addition is 
not a question of mental representation or interpretation of “the rule of addi-
tion”, but rather is a feel acquired through concrete examples for what counts 
as proceeding in the “same way”: a feel for practice (Wittgenstein, 1958, §§ 
71, 75, 78, 208, 210). As Wittgenstein says: “If I have exhausted the justifica-
tions I have reached bedrock and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to 
say: ‘This is simply what I do’” (Wittgenstein, 1958, §217). In the doing 
itself, in the action, not the representation of it, is a tacit embodied under-
standing of the situation. 
The role of rules in practical knowing, and thus of the possibility of prop-
ositionally expressing what is involved in it, has been a point of much debate, 
not least because Wittgenstein has had other receptions than the Scandinavian 
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one. Thus, in the English-speaking world, his main point concerning practice 
has been taken to be that rules are ‘flexible’ and require interpretation in new 
situations (Baker & Hacker, 1984; Kripke, 1982; C. Winch, 2006; P. Winch, 
1990). The premise is that practice is necessarily rule-governed; the problem 
is just to explain what we as rule-followers actually do when we follow the 
rules. Eikeland, too, seems to understand Wittgenstein in this way when he 
discusses the latter’s interest in establishing the ‘grammar’ of our practices. 
Eikeland refers to Wittgenstein when he stresses that we as practitioners have 
a tacit understanding-in-use of the regulations of grammar in our language: 
grammar, he says, makes up the “performance standards” we as language 
users all relate to in the same way, regardless of our individual level of 
“tacitness or articulation of the common forms” (p. 25). The ‘common forms’ 
of grammar can, however, be articulated in theoretical representations: in 
theoria. Theoria in this way makes explicit what we already know implicitly, 
‘from inside’, through use. “[P]raxis-based theôría is knowledge shared in 
common between thinking individuals through language. Praxis is shared or 
shareable as theôría” (p. 27). The premise, it would seem, is again that 
practice is necessarily rule-governed and that practical knowing is the feel of 
‘being regulated by the rule in practice’. 
In contrast, I wish to follow Dreyfus in insisting that practice can be regu-
lar without being rule-governed (Dreyfus, 1979). Furthermore, I think this is 
precisely what Wittgenstein was trying to convey: Not that rules, perfor-
mance standards, do not regulate us. They do. But that we have a tacit practi-
cal embodied understanding of practice which goes deeper than the rule, 
which so to speak regulates the way we let rules regulate our practice: It 
gives us the ‘feel for’ when rules should be followed, when they should be 
amended and when an exception would be appropriate. It is what lets us 
determine whether a rule has been followed in the first place. Furthermore, 
even if large parts of our practice may be described by rules, this does not 
necessarily mean that we are led by the rules when we act (Wackerhausen, 
1991). The regularities may be an emerging phenomenon. Alternatively, 
regularities may, as Dreyfus stresses, be the result of holistic patterns in our 
activities, resulting for their part from our holistic pattern recognition across 
situations, rather than the result of explicable rules. 
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In sum, practical knowing is the tacit feel in action for how to proceed. It 
is a feel which cannot be fully expressed in rules, or indeed in words, because 
it is that whereby one evaluates the adequacy of any rule, or indeed any 
words, supposedly capturing it. Practical knowing can thus not be fully 
articulated as propositional knowledge. Like personal experience, it does 
however contribute to a tacit field of meaning on which we draw when we 
understand the words of others. In the next section I explicate further how the 
different aspects of knowledge, though not reducible to each other, act to-
gether to form ‘knowledge in practice’. 
2.3 Knowledge in practice 
An indication of how the experiential and practical aspects of knowledge 
intertwine with propositional knowledge in ‘knowledge in practice’ is pro-
vided in an example introduced by Polanyi (Polanyi, 1962, p. 101). The 
example concerns the discrimination of relevant features on an X-ray picture, 
by the medical student and the doctors, respectively. Polanyi describes how a 
medical student, when first presented with an X-ray picture of the lungs, is 
not able to see anything but the ribs: she cannot see the lungs and certainly 
not any specific traits in them, so she understands nothing of what the expert 
radiographers are saying to one another. After having seen several such 
pictures, though, the student gradually becomes able not only to make out the 
lungs, but also to discriminate between traits due to natural variation and 
traits caused by illnesses of various kinds. The words of the radiographers 
begin to make some sense. In this process, literally, the linguistic terms and 
the propositional knowledge of the textbooks acquire concrete meaning for 
the student in the form of experiential ‘knowledge of’ the look of different 
pulmonary diseases, intertwined with practical ‘knowing how’ to discern the 
lungs and their features. The ‘know how’ (practical aspect), ‘know of’ (expe-
riential aspect) and ‘know that’ (propositional aspect) are thus acquired as a 
unity (but with all aspects analytically discernible and so non-reducible), a 
unity which moreover is perspectival in nature: The intertwined knowledge 
acquired by the student lets traits stand out for her with the significance they 
have; even decides to some extent what is a trait as opposed to e.g. ‘how the 
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lungs in general look’, ‘an irrelevant misrepresentation of the X-ray ma-
chine’, or nothing at all. This allows her to ‘catch sight of’ important health-
related traits and neglect, ‘see through’, irrelevant features like the ribs and 
individual peculiarities. In comparison with the expert radiographer, the 
perspective of the student is of course a partial and restricted one, allowing 
her to discriminate only ‘the most obvious’ from the point of view of the 
former. Nonetheless, it is a beginning ‘knowledge in practice’ of the ways to 
use X-rays in diagnosis. 
Polanyi’s example gives a perspicuous illustration of the tacit semantic 
components of words, of the relationship between tacit and linguistic 
knowledge, and of the perspectival nature of knowledge. In a decisive re-
spect, however, it is too restricted, on the verge of being misleading. It con-
veys the impression that ‘knowledge in practice’ is exercised in a static 
viewing of static scenes rather unrelated to the contexts of the scenes, as if 
e.g. X-ray pictures suddenly popped up out of the blue to be inspected and 
then vanished again. It neglects the fact that such pictures are taken as part of 
the ongoing activity of diagnosing and helping a person with a medical 
complaint. Thus, having ‘knowledge in practice’ in relation to X-ray pictures 
importantly involves knowing when to take them, and how to act from what 
they indicate, as well as being able to see what is on them. Furthermore, it 
does not first and foremost involve knowing this propositionally and on 
reflection, but instead knowing it ‘actionably’, as action-requests of the 
situation, in the very response to the requests itself. The perspective of 
‘knowledge in practice’ is action-oriented. This point corresponds to Drey-
fus’ and Dreyfus’ claim that the expert immediately and intuitively perceives 
and, without reflection, carries out the actions called for in the concrete 
situation (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986). In contrast to the claim made by Drey-
fus and Dreyfus, however, my analysis does not deny propositional 
knowledge a role in knowledge in practice, but rather sees it as an integrated 
aspect. 
The example makes visible a number of points concerning the nature of 
‘knowledge in practice’ and the way its three aspects (propositional, experi-
ential and practical knowledge) relate to but are not reducible to one another: 
‘Knowledge in practice’ is a perspective with which the agent meets the 
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world and through which the world makes sense to him/her. The perspective 
is action-oriented and significance-structuring, i.e. it lets the situation present 
itself ‘action-packed’ and meaningful, resonating with tacit aspects of signifi-
cance, and lets traits of the situation stand out as ‘to be acted upon’. In some 
instances, this ‘acting upon’ will take place as pure Dreyfusian intuitive 
pairing of responses, without reflection or propositional representation. 
Benner reports several instances of this kind, one of which concerns a nurse 
reacting at once with chest compression and defibrillation when a monitor 
showed signs of ventricular fibrillation (Benner, 1984, p. 110ff). Eraut simi-
larly stresses that the choices made in the “hot action” of teaching “are 
largely intuitive” (Eraut, 1985, p. 128). In other instances, part of the ‘acting 
upon’ will involve ‘taking note of’, ‘discussing’, ‘applying this or that theory’ 
etc., e.g. when doctors discuss the plausibility of different diagnoses, or 
teachers consider which textbooks to use the following school year. In these 
instances, the propositional knowledge deemed relevant for description, 
analysis or discussion stands out because of the perspective so that traits of 
the situation present themselves immediately as ‘examples of this theory’, 
‘describable by that process’, ‘effects of this cause’ or perhaps as ‘not yet 
quite accounted for and important to investigate in greater depth’. That is, the 
situation presents itself as already significance-structured in terms of rele-
vance for certain areas of the practitioner’s propositional knowledge. As for 
the propositional knowledge which thus ‘comes to mind’, it will correspond-
ingly present itself as already actualised and adequately modified to be 
relevant for the given situation. 
In all instances, the ones involving propositional representation and the 
ones that do not alike, propositional knowledge has a role to play, together 
with personal experience and practical knowing, at the level of determining 
what stands out in the first place as ‘to be acted upon’ in the situation. It does 
so because it, together with personal experience and practical knowing, forms 
the unity of ‘knowledge in practice’, and therefore is part of the perspective 
with which the agent meets the world. Thus, the nurse who reacted at once, 
without propositional representation, to the signs of ventricular fibrillation 
did so because the propositional knowledge that these signs might be the 
beginning of a cardiac arrest was integrated in her ‘knowledge in practice’. 
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Not as something she had to think about (represent propositionally), but as 
part of what she met and participated in the situation with, i.e. as an active, 
actionable part of the perspective. As such, it not only allowed her to act 
resolutely, but was at play in her ‘zooming in on’ the ventricular fibrillation 
as ‘the most important feature at the moment’ to begin with. 
As argued above, the relationship between the propositional, experiential, 
and practical aspects of knowledge within the unity of ‘knowledge in prac-
tice’ is one of interrelation, but non-reducibility, in that the latter two consti-
tute a resonance field of meaning for the first which is necessary for its 
adequate understanding. Personal experience and practical knowing ‘give 
body to the words’ of propositional knowledge, both figuratively speaking in 
the sense that they supply full significance to the words, and in the more 
concrete sense that this ‘full significance’ comes in the form of experiential 
bodily responsiveness to the given phenomena and of practical sense of how 
to go about them. Because of this, the tacit dimensions are vital for the signif-
icance-structuring which knowledge in practice supplies to any situation. 
Bringing them to play, letting their significance resonate, in a concrete situa-
tion, is required in order for the practitioner to understand what his/her 
propositional knowledge more precisely means here, and which implications 
it has in terms of action. 
On the other hand, propositional knowledge provides a possibility of fur-
ther interpretation, (re)direction and transformation of experiential and 
practical knowledge. As regards the latter, if someone displays an inappropri-
ate habit in the exercise of a skill (like grasping the clarinet too tensely), 
articulating this fact and keeping a (propositionally expressed) focus on 
refraining to do so may help change the habit until a new way of exercising 
the skill without propositional awareness has developed. With regard to the 
former, as is well-known from psychotherapy and as argued by Taylor con-
cerning emotions like love, shame, and jealousy (Taylor, 1985, Ch. 2), one’s 
interpretation of a personal experience may change when propositional 
knowledge is articulated about it. Indeed, it may change to such an extent that 
the personal experience itself is transformed. Through therapy for example, 
the personal experience of being a mother for the first time may transform 
from a complex of feelings dominated by anxiety and self-devaluation to a 
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more positive complex saturated by hopefulness, where the feelings of anxie-
ty and self-devaluation have perhaps not disappeared but have decreased in 
significance and have been integrated with other, more positive, feelings. It 
is, however, important to note the following concerning the transformation of 
experience through linguistic expression: Firstly, the possibility hereof does 
not negate the tacit nature of personal experience nor its necessity for ‘full 
understanding’ of a given phenomenon. To have one’s experience of clarinet 
music changed forever by hearing its sound described as an ‘oboe in a tunnel’ 
does not mean that the personal experience of it has been articulated fully in 
words. It just means it has been touched by words and transformed in the 
process. And obviously, one still has to have the personal experience of both 
clarinet and oboe for this to happen. Transformation of personal experience 
through articulation is itself dependent on the resonance of the significance-
rich sense of personal experience. Secondly, personal experiences are not 
arbitrarily or indefinitely malleable. Though feelings may change by being 
(re-)described (a feeling of unspecified resentment may be recognised as 
jealousy, whereby it transforms from the unspecified mode to a more distinct 
sentiment), they cannot change into anything, everything or nothing, just by 
fixing certain words to them. As Taylor puts it: “[Our feelings] cannot just be 
shaped at will by the account we offer of them. On the contrary, an articula-
tion purports to characterise a feeling; it is meant to be faithful to what it is 
that moves us. There is a getting it right and getting it wrong in this domain. 
Articulations are like interpretations in that they are attempts to make clearer 
the imports things have for us.” (Taylor, 1985, pp. 64-65). 
Summing up, in this section I have presented an ontological analysis of 
the knowledge of the practitioner, ‘knowledge in practice’, in order to remedy 
the lack of clarity in the action research literature concerning the relationship 
to one another of allegedly different forms of knowledge. In contrast to the 
two different tendencies in the literature (to either unwittingly reduce other 
knowledge forms to propositional knowledge in actual argumentative prac-
tice, or distinguish knowledge forms to the point where it becomes unclear 
how they relate at all), my analysis has pointed out three knowledge forms 
that are distinct and non-reducible, but which interrelate and supply meaning 
to one another. They are distinct and non-reducible, in that they have distinct 
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ontological realisations as, respectively, a bodily responsiveness to a given 
phenomenon (experiential knowledge), an embodied understanding in the 
doing itself (practical knowledge) and linguistic representation (propositional 
knowledge). They interrelate and supply meaning to one another, because the 
former two constitute a resonance field of meaning for the latter, which in 
turn provides a possibility of further interpretation and transformation of the 
other two. Their interrelation forms a holistic unity which is an action-
oriented perspective on the situation. This perspective supplies significance-
structuring to the situation and lets traits within it present themselves as 
meaningful in relation to the overall significance-structuring. 
 On the basis of the view of knowledge presented here, the ‘knowledge in 
practice’ of the practitioners in the vignette may be analysed in the following 
way: As IT experts serving as company teachers, their ‘knowledge in prac-
tice’ integrated a range of fields, including proficiency in the use of the IT-
system which the course was about, company procedures and culture, com-
munication in global and intercultural contexts, and pedagogical structuring 
of learning activities. Their diverse practical, experiential, and propositional 
knowledge (on how to go about the IT-system; what to do when the system 
broke down; how pedagogically to present course content in a way at once in 
accordance with company culture and understandable for an intercultural 
audience etc.) acted together as a unified whole to shape the meaning which 
the proposed e-learning course had for them. As sketched in the vignette, the 
course more specifically took on the meaning of being unmanageable, too 
expensive and giving too little consideration to the course participants’ 
diverse cultural backgrounds. The action-orientedness of this meaning had 
previously consisted in the action possibilities of re-designing the form and 
objectives of the course; on the day described in the vignette, it consisted in 
terminating the project.2 
                                           
2  The fact that I am able to linguistically analyse the aspects involved in the teachers’ 
‘knowledge in practice’ does not imply that there are no tacit dimensions. What I do is 
to point at the areas of tacit knowledge and the way these areas structured the situation 
for the teachers as judged by what they said. I do not put the tacit aspects themselves 
into words. I do draw on my own resonance field of meaning concerning teaching and 
classroom management, though, in trying to understand the significance the situation 
had for them, as I think my reader will, too. 
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3.  Methodological implications for action research 
Across the various approaches to action research, a common denominator is 
the wish to improve practice through intervening in it in cooperation with the 
practitioners. As stated by Toulmin, “Action research calls not just for expla-
nations, but for improvements” (Toulmin & Gustavsen, 1996, p. 210). Or in 
the words of Pedersen and Olesen (referring for their part to Kondrat & Juliá, 
1997): “Action research is change oriented in intent. It is ultimately about 
collective action aimed at transforming social structures, and challenging 
practices that unjust [sic] constrain social/economic opportunity or oppress 
specific social groups…” (Pedersen & Olesen, 2008, p. 16). A large number 
of action research projects, including the project described in the vignette, 
furthermore take the cooperation between practitioners and researchers to be 
one of collaboration towards the common goal of co-creating new knowledge 
for and about practice (cf. e.g. Heron & Reason, 2001; Svensson, Brulin, 
Ellström, & Widegren, 2002). I the following I shall discuss a number of 
methodological implications which the view of knowledge presented above 
has for this kind of action research. 
It is a consequence of the preceding analysis that ‘knowledge in practice’ 
is essential for describing and understanding practice, as well as for establish-
ing areas in need of improvement and for evaluating the changes which an 
intervention brings about: Seeing realistic ‘possible alternatives’ requires the 
perspective of ‘knowledge in practice’, including its tacit practical resonance 
field of what might reasonably be expected to happen, should certain changes 
be implemented. Persons without the experiential and practical aspects of 
‘knowledge in practice’ do not have sufficient exemplary basis to draw upon 
in understanding the propositional knowledge and therefore the propositional 
knowledge only has superficial, abstract, non-actualised meaning for them. 
The words will be ‘mere words’, i.e. they will not have an action-oriented 
significance, neither in relation to understanding status quo, nor in relation to 
posing and evaluating alternatives. For this reason, changes suggested by 
persons without the experiential and practical aspects will often be ‘too 
theoretical’, impractical or impossible to implement in the concrete given 
situation with its unique constellation of individual, social, organisational, 
managerial, and technical circumstances. 
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At the outset of an action research project, this is the predicament of re-
searchers who are not also (former) practitioners within the action practice. 
They will not have ‘knowledge in practice’ within the field and therefore will 
not have a significance-rich understanding, neither of what the practitioners 
say nor of the implications of any suggestions they might make. In an im-
portant sense, they do not know what they are doing when they engage in the 
action practice. This was the case for my fellow action researcher and me in 
the project described in the vignette and our lack of significant-rich under-
standing of the action practice was a key factor in the failure of the project. I 
return to this point below. 
Researchers, however, in general have something else. They have 
‘knowledge in practice’ of scientific investigation processes and theoretical 
knowledge relevant to the action practice, for example learning theory, social 
activity theory, or organizational theory. They have both ‘methodological 
knowledge’ and ‘content knowledge’, to use the terminology of Dick, String-
er, and Huxham (Dick, Stringer, & Huxham, 2009). Furthermore, they have 
‘knowledge in practice’ concerning how to ‘go about’ such theoretical 
knowledge within their scientific practice, i.e. how to discuss, critique, 
develop, and evaluate it through further theoretical and empirical studies (cf. 
Kanigel, 1986; Zuckerman, 1996). In other words, though researchers at the 
outset are ‘outsiders’ to action practice, they are not outsiders per se, but 
rather are ‘insiders’ to other practices. As argued by Dreier, as living beings 
we always bring other life contexts with us to the present one and the sense 
the latter makes for us depends on the activities which are meaningful to us 
elsewhere (Dreier, 2007). For this reason, researchers, too, bring something 
potentially very valuable to the action research process. 
More specifically, practice may create ‘blind spots’ which hide the inade-
quacy, injustice or even cruelty of certain habitual ways of acting. As non-
practitioners, action researchers may be in a position to identify such ‘blind 
spots’ and therefore to question the routines of practice and the aims and 
values explicitly or, more often, implicitly underlying these practices. Not, as 
conventional wisdom has it (Wenger, McDermott, & Snyder, 2002), because 
they are outsiders to the practice, or even because they are ‘insider-outsiders’ 
who at once “actively engage in the phenomenon... and objectively view their 
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own process of engagement” in the words of Poonamallee (Poonamallee, 
2009, p. 74) (cf. Bartunek & Louis, 1996). Rather, they can do so in virtue of 
being insiders to other practices. Their ‘knowledge in practice’ pertaining to 
these other practices may supply the situation with a relevance structuring, 
letting certain traits or even the situation as such present themselves as inade-
quate, unjust or the like. In this sense, the action researcher may act as a 
catalyst of discussions about the ways and premises of a practice. 
However, the significance of comments on the action practice made by 
the action researcher must necessarily be evaluated by the practitioners. It 
takes ‘knowledge in practice’ to validly discriminate between ‘practice-
developing suggestions’ and ‘far-fetched practice-eroding’ ideas. Likewise, 
the practitioner’s perspective of ‘knowledge in practice’ is required to assess 
and explain which changes should be instantiated, why, and with which 
means. It is also needed to assess the degree of success of an intervention: It 
takes the resonance of practical and experiential meaning to fully understand 
the significance and scope of propositionally stated goals and therefore also 
to evaluate whether the goals have in fact been reached, and, if they have, 
whether by acceptable means. Thus, the practitioners’ ‘knowledge in prac-
tice’ is necessary both for the validation of the interpretation of the situation 
supplied by the action researchers’ ‘knowledge in practice’ and for an as-
sessment of the practical implications of this interpretation. Even if the action 
researcher supplies the initiating comments, she still does not quite know 
what she is doing. 
What is needed here is an intertwinement between the ‘knowledge in 
practice’ of the researcher and that of the practitioner. This answer is, howev-
er, much more easily identified than it is brought about in actual research 
projects. Given the nature of ‘knowledge in practice’ it cannot be brought 
about simply by holding meetings and talking about research and action 
practice. Practitioners and researchers literally need to ‘work their way’ into 
each other’s fields. They have to gain practical and experiential knowledge of 
‘how to do’ the practice in question. They have to establish sufficient tacit 
common ground for them to understand what the other party says beyond the 
‘mere words’, and to allow them to develop enough of the significance-
structuring perspective pertaining to the other party’s practice to see the 
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action research project ‘from their side’, i.e. see which traits stand out for the 
other party and with what significance. 
Establishing such tacit common ground is a time consuming process 
which ideally never ends, but in practice is fraught with the risk of partici-
pants believing too soon that it has been completed: After becoming initially 
acquainted with each other’s practices, the words said by both parties will 
make at least some sense, and it may not be clear how much depth of tacit 
significance is actually missing. The risk is especially great when working 
under time constraints and/or with a project plan which specifies ‘milestones’ 
to be reached, leading for example to the specification of a certain deadline 
by which ‘establishment of mutual understanding of each other’s practices’ 
should be attained. Ironically, the risk is greater the more the parties recog-
nise and respect each other’s areas of expertise as domains on which they do 
not themselves have the knowledge required, which they should therefore 
leave to the other party, but which may ‘supplement’ their own knowledge. If 
convergence between the fields of action of the participants and intertwine-
ment of their ‘knowledge in practice’ are not continuously seen as goals to be 
pursued, chances are that participants will believe they understand each other 
when in fact they don’t. The result is divergent views of what the project is 
about, which interventions should be undertaken, what the criteria of success 
are, and when they have been met. 
This is precisely what happened in the case described in the vignette. 
Though we went through an initial phase of getting to know each other’s 
practices, this phase was not long enough, nor was it practical enough. Given 
that we as researchers were not former practitioners of the action practice and 
that the practitioners for their part had never been involved in research be-
fore, let alone research on the design of learning situations; the year and a 
half we spent getting the project group together, defining the project and 
working with each other was not enough. The time we spent trying out each 
other’s practical work processes was too limited for us to really get at the 
tacit dimensions of each other’s ‘knowledge in practice’ We were satisfied 
too early in the process that we ‘more or less’ knew how the other party saw 
the project and that our respective ‘knowledge in practice’ as researchers and 
practitioners would supplement each other and in combination qualify the 
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project. The result was that we ‘saw’ the situation in different ways on the 
basis of our diverging ‘knowledge in practice’ perspectives. We therefore in 
practice disagreed on the nature of learning and on means of assessing learn-
ing, though we had repeatedly agreed on these issues ‘in so many words’ in 
our many meetings. Similarly, we disagreed on criteria of significance and 
success. In the end, I now think, we disagreed on what the project was about: 
For us as action researchers it was about designing a course which was 
relevant and motivating for the people who were to take it and which sup-
ported them in integrating the new course content into their work practice. 
For the company participants I now believe the project was about designing 
an efficient course for the teacher. Be that as it may, the bottom line is that 
we failed in establishing an intertwinement of ‘knowledge in practice’ be-
tween the participants. For this reason, the critical remarks of my fellow 
action researcher and me concerning the view of learning held by the compa-
ny participants were not recognized by them as ‘to the point’ and our sugges-
tions concerning the design of the course were seen as precisely that: sugges-
tions, not indispensable changes justified by learning theory (as they were to 
us). We, for our part, never quite got the perspective of the company, and 
therefore were not able to present our suggestions in a way that accorded with 
what was prioritised by their perspective. 
Other studies within the action research literature report problems similar 
to ours where agreement between participants seemed to be established at the 
level of linguistically expressed propositions, but where underlying differ-
ences in understanding caused impediments and disruptions to the projects. 
Interpreting these problems as problems of divergences in ‘knowledge in 
practice’ helps explain their intractability. Pedersen and Olesen supply two 
such cases (Pedersen & Olesen, 2008), one concerning a competence devel-
opment project in a psychiatric ward (Olesen’s example), the other investigat-
ing gendered meanings in Danish aid organisations (Pedersen’s example). 
Albinsson and Arnesson provide one on the development of appropriate IT 
supported practices in health care (Albinsson & Arnesson, 2010). Due to 
space considerations, only one example will be analysed here as a supple-
ment to the vignette. The example is Olesen’s, i.e. the project in the psychiat-
ric ward. This project was undertaken by two action researchers and three 
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practitioners: a nurse, a doctor, and a psychiatrist (Pedersen & Olesen, 2008). 
Further details on the project are supplied in (Olesen & Nordentoft, 2013). 
The focus of the project, on which all participants agreed propositionally, was 
to develop new ways of communicating diagnoses and treatment options to 
schizophrenic patients and their relatives. As described by Pedersen and 
Olesen, the project suffered greatly from diverging understandings between 
practitioners and action researchers on what scientific research can or should 
be, and in particular from the fact that the main action researcher (Olesen) did 
not explicitly take up this issue and articulate her basic views on language, 
relations, and power though they were part of her theoretical justification for 
conducting research as joint-ownership projects. Initially, she did not do this 
because she “considered that its explication would be distracting for the local 
practitioners” (p. 9). Afterwards, she derided herself for not doing so (ibid.) 
because of the resulting lack of clarity for the participants concerning re-
search methods. Yet at the same time, Pedersen and Olesen describe the 
culture at the hospital as “dominated by a diagnostic and fault-finding cul-
ture, making it unusual to engage in collaborative dialogue” (p. 10). They 
also emphasise the practitioners’ familiarity with the research methods of the 
natural sciences, established through former research projects at the ward 
(and presumably also to some extent during their education). In other words, 
the practitioners’ knowledge in practice resonated with non-collaborative, 
non-dialogic, positivist experiential and practical knowledge of coping with 
life at the psychiatric ward, including communication with patients and their 
relatives (the focal area of the project) and ways to investigate and communi-
cate about psychiatric phenomena with colleagues. Their knowledge in 
practice-perspective thus made suggestions of joint-ownership and collabora-
tive knowledge production stand out as bewildering, non-productive, non-
efficient and non-scientific (pp. 9, 13, 15). In this situation, Olesen’s wariness 
of articulating her theoretical viewpoints might well have been a perceptive 
anticipation, on the basis of her action researcher ‘knowledge in practice’ of 
the scepticism and perplexity with which the practitioners would have reacted 
had she done so. 
On the other hand, Olesen did not actually ‘work her way’ into the prac-
tice herself, but only approached it through project activities such as observa-
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tions and interviews. This means that she never came to share the practition-
ers’ resonance field of tacit significance, and therefore was unable to draw on 
it in her attempts to convince the practitioners of the advantages of joint 
project ownership. Conversely, since having such a resonance field is a 
prerequisite for an adequate evaluation of interpretations of practice and 
changes introduced to it, Olesen’s descriptions of the project and her evalua-
tion that she in spite of all succeeded in introducing more appropriate teach-
ing methods at the ward are actually highly questionable. She even concedes 
so herself when she remarks that “…we experienced more or less direct 
negotiations regarding the types of knowledge that collaborative work ought 
to produce, and about who would be interested in the generated knowledge. 
After all, why should the participants be interested in a deconstruction of the 
field’s own practices and epistemologies? And what use could they make of 
interference with their own understandings of relevance in a situation where 
they, and not the researchers, possessed intimate knowledge about the organi-
sation?” (p. 15). This way of phrasing the issue is made from the point of 
view of the researcher who is convinced that her “deconstruction of practices 
and epistemologies” are theoretically sound even if the practitioners do not 
recognise this to be the case. The upshot of my analysis of the necessity of 
knowledge in practice for the validation of action research projects is that 
such a conviction is not justified.  
 These examples point to general quality issues for many action research 
projects. If intertwinement between the ‘knowledge in practice’ of practition-
ers and researchers is not established, participants will not know what they 
are doing, nor understand (fully) what they are saying. The risk of misunder-
standings and failure of the project is big and serious methodological issues 
ensue concerning its progress and assessment. The researcher will not be able 
to discern and evaluate adequately the changes brought about in the project 
without the ‘knowledge in practice’ perspective of the action practice, nor can 
she appraise the influence which the designed changes had in relation to other 
factors (such as Hawthorne-like factors, possible coinciding staff changes, 
other initiatives, etc.). The practitioner, on the other hand, though in a better 
position to notice changes, will lack the research ‘knowledge in practice’ to 
judge the scientific relevance which various factors had on establishing the 
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changes. Assessment of the action research intervention and its results thus 
falls squarely between the practitioners and the researchers, with neither party 
able to undertake it because they lack the necessary ‘knowledge in practice’. 
And when the action researcher reports the project within the scientific 
community, she will have only a very limited understanding of what she is 
talking about (as will her audience): Because she does not have the practical 
and experiential resonance field of meaning, she will only understand the 
linguistic tip of the iceberg about which she is writing. The possible future 
developments of practice which she can foresee are severely limited in depth 
as well as in number by the lack of the action-oriented perspective of 
‘knowledge in practice’. In consequence, so is her understanding of the 
implications of the project for theoretical issues within her scientific field. 
The requirement that practitioners and action researchers should ‘work their 
way’ into each other’s practices in order to facilitate an intertwinement of 
their ‘knowledge in practice’ is therefore quite as paramount, if the project is 
to contribute to scientific development, as it is for ensuring improvements in 
practice. 
4.  Intertwining opportunities within different approaches 
Action research is a broad field involving various ways of structuring collab-
oration between practitioners and researchers aimed at co-creation of 
knowledge. In this section, I consider three types of approaches as to their 
stand vis-a-vis the demand for intertwining of ‘knowledge in practice’. The 
claim is not that these three approaches are representative of action research 
in general or on all counts. They do, however, constitute the two end poles of 
and a ‘middle point’ on a continuum of ways of organising researcher and 
practitioner participation in action research projects as regards the possibility 
of developing ‘knowledge in practice’. They therefore give paradigmatic 
illustrations of the possibilities for intertwining of researcher and practitioner 
‘knowledge in practice’; i.e. other approaches will in this respect be similar 
to the one or other of these approaches. The three types of approaches dis-
cussed are ‘division of labour’; ‘mutual apprenticeship’, and ‘co-operative 
inquiry’. 
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The ‘division of labour’ strategy is characteristic of all projects where re-
searchers and practitioners have definite and distinct knowledge responsibili-
ties in relation to one another. Typically, researchers supply research meth-
odology and knowledge of collaboration methods and practitioners supply the 
project itself (focus area, aim, workplace participants etc.) and knowledge 
about the concrete organisational setting. Genat’s participatory action re-
search represents an example (Genat, 2009). The role of the researcher is here 
described as that of “a facilitator, interlocutor, interpreter, capacity developer, 
and advocate” (p. 114). The practitioners for their part supply the experiences 
and problems to be interpreted. The aim of the research is to articulate the 
“(often) subjugated knowledge” (p. 107) of the practitioners in order to build 
“local knowledge” (ibid.) and let them acquire new understandings of their 
world and of how they can transform their particular life situation for the 
better. In addition, the researcher may have her own general research ques-
tions (e.g. “how do [Aboriginal] health workers describe and interpret their 
work-related activities”, p. 106) which are then informed by the participants’ 
practice-related questions (e.g. “how do we get better at what we do, and, 
how do health workers within the organisation gain greater professional 
status”, ibid.).  
The ‘division of labour’ strategy depends crucially on linguistic represen-
tation of practices. Practitioners and researcher meet and talk about action 
practice, but do not partake in each other’s practices. Though it is recognised 
that practitioners have ‘local knowledge’, it is presupposed that this ‘local 
knowledge’ can be formulated in words which the researcher will understand. 
Genat thus emphasises that practitioners have knowledge which researchers 
do not, and that their participation in, and ownership of, the research project 
therefore is vital. However, he explicitly equates knowledge with theory 
(Genat, 2009, pp. 106, 107, 108), thereby signifying that he understands all 
knowledge to be propositional. Local knowledge to him seemingly is local, 
solely in the sense of being available only at a given socio-material position. 
It is not local in the sense that essential context-dependent experiential and 
practical knowledge is acquirable only at this socio-material position. In 
general, a consequence of the ‘division of labour’ approach is that the tacit 
dimensions of knowledge in practice and their significance for understanding 
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propositional knowledge are ignored. No intertwining of practitioner and 
researcher ‘knowledge in practice’ is established. The only common ground 
is the significant-poor one of propositional descriptions which the parties can 
agree to make. 
A further premise behind the ‘division of labour’-strategy is that the ex-
pertise of researchers and practitioners, respectively, are complementary and 
that they may combine in the action research project to make a ‘larger whole’ 
from the complementary contributions of each perspective. The problem is 
that ‘knowledge in practice’ within the action practice is not just a ‘contribu-
tion’ among other ‘contributions’. Rather, it is a precondition for the adequate 
evaluation of how ‘contributions’ may fit together in the development of 
practice as well as of what is a relevant contribution in the first place. There-
fore, ‘knowledge in practice’ is a prerequisite for making adequate decisions 
about divisions of labour, not a part of such a division. 
In consequence, the ‘division of labour’-strategy highlights the methodo-
logical challenges indicated in the last section. Choosing this strategy does 
not in fact ‘divide’ the research task between the participants according to 
expertise (as intended), but instead places the research task on the practitioner 
(who has ‘knowledge in practice’ within the field) and divides the researcher 
away from her research. This is an unhappy situation for the researcher, in 
respect of her research field and research community. It is also unfortunate 
methodologically speaking. Though the researchers may influence the practi-
tioners on how to evaluate the output of the action research, e.g. on the choice 
and use of evaluation methods, the task of evaluation will be the practition-
er’s. But he will not have the necessary significance-rich understanding of 
how to actually conduct evaluation in practice because he has not been 
trained as a researcher. He therefore cannot be expected to describe and 
evaluate his practice in accordance with the demands of research methodolo-
gy, even if he makes his evaluations with the necessary significance-rich 
understanding of the action practice. Adding to this general problem is the 
further one indicated above that practice may create ‘blind spots’, and that the 
practitioner may be too entangled in practice to be able to see them. Though 
entanglement on the one hand is a prerequisite for a significance-rich under-
standing of practice, the downside to it is that a critical stance towards prac-
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tice may be hard to take. The upshot of these considerations is that the strate-
gy of ‘division of labour’ in the end leaves the practitioner with a research 
task for which he is not equipped, whilst leaving the researcher only with the 
option (or demand) of making critical comments, the propriety of which she 
cannot judge and the consequences of which she cannot tell. This is hardly a 
methodologically viable way of conducting research. 
The strategy of ‘mutual apprenticeship’, in contrast, builds on recognition 
of the need for researcher and practitioners to establish a common ground of 
acting as a basis for understanding each other and developing an action 
research project. The strategy is argued for theoretically by Eikeland who 
chooses the perhaps somewhat unfortunate (for its imperialist connotations) 
phrase of ‘going native’ to describe a situation where the action researcher 
takes part in the practice of the practitioner, and at the same time lets him 
take part in the practice of research (Eikeland, 2006). It is, in effect, exempli-
fied in the work of Poonamallee though she presents her study in terms of 
holistic Hindu philosophy and describes her position as an “insider-outsider” 
(Poonamallee, 2009).  
The basic idea of the strategy is that practitioner and researcher take on 
the relationship of master and apprentice vis-a-vis one another as regards 
their respective areas of expertise. The two roles repeatedly interchange 
throughout the different stages of a research project. This collaboration form 
does not presuppose that participants’ complementary areas of expertise may 
be combined much like pieces in a puzzle to form a ‘greater whole’. Rather, 
the premise is that complementarity may be the starting point of a collabora-
tion, even a necessary starting point since participants engage with one 
another because of what they each bring to the project, but does not suffice as 
the ground on which to build the collaboration. The requirement is that 
researcher and practitioner become, not only acquainted with each other’s 
practices, but fair participants in them. This facilitates their development of 
experiential and practical knowledge within the other party’s field. The 
quality concerns voiced in the last section therefore stand good chances of 
being met: Over time the researcher will develop a significant-rich resonance 
field to draw on in her descriptions and evaluations of the project. As the 
practitioners gain ‘knowledge in practice’ within research, the parties will 
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increasingly be able to undertake descriptions and evaluations together. 
Eventually, both parties will know what they are doing and understand what 
they are saying. 
Nonetheless, it is highly questionable how often this approach is realized 
in practice. It has several economical and organisational implementation 
problems, most of which we experienced in the case described in the vi-
gnette. Several of the problems were present, too, in the cases described by 
Pedersen, Olesen, and Albinsson and Arnesson (Albinsson & Arnesson, 
2010; Pedersen & Olesen, 2008). Though their research projects were not 
designed as ‘mutual apprenticeship’ projects, they were intended to build on 
the ‘partial apprenticeship’ of involving the practitioners in the research 
process. The issues which arose in pursuing this aim are relevant to the 
‘mutual apprenticeship’ approach, too. Firstly, working one’s way into 
someone else’s practice takes a long time and so is costly. Action research 
projects often grabble with funding issues: ours did, as did Pedersen’s, 
Olesen’s and Albinsson’s and Arnesson’s, and practitioners are typically only 
allotted a comparatively small amount of hours to participate in them, if any 
at all. Researchers likewise have limited time to partake in the action practice. 
Often, there is simply not enough funding to allow participants to gain 
‘knowledge in practice’ within each other’s fields. Secondly, as pointed out 
by Pedersen and Olesen (Pedersen & Olesen, 2008, p. 5), action research 
projects are typically accessed through the management level, but are often 
carried out with other practitioners in the organizations who either choose 
themselves to participate or are assigned to the project by the management 
level. In the first instance, the actual practitioners, as in Pedersen’s case, are 
not necessarily the most central ones for realising and implementing the 
project. In the second instance, practitioners need not be very committed to 
the project. This took place in Olesen’s case and to some extent in the vi-
gnette case, too. Thirdly, organisations may for reasons of confidentiality 
limit the researcher’s access to some of the relevant work settings. From her 
description, it seems clear that this was part of the problem in Pedersen’s 
case. Fourthly, the practitioners may not see the point of the ‘partial’ or 
‘mutual apprenticeship’ at all, because their take on the project is a ‘division 
of labour’ approach where they expect the actual research process to be the 
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researchers’ responsibility. This happened in both Pedersen’s and Olesen’s 
cases (p. 9). In a somewhat different way, it happened in the vignette case, 
too. Here, we did agree ‘in so many words’ to take part in each other’s prac-
tices to establish a common ground. As it turned out, however, we, research-
ers and practitioners, simply did not understand the ideal of ‘mutual appren-
ticeship’ in the same sense. This is the problem of ‘knowledge in practice’ 
once more: Our respective significant-rich understanding of what ‘mutual 
apprenticeship’ entails differed significantly in terms e.g. of time and of the 
type and amount of specific activities we should undertake in each other’s 
practices. My fellow researcher and I repeatedly experienced a lack of inter-
est on the part of the practitioners when we sought to involve them in re-
search methodology. They, for their part, were probably aggravated by our 
repeated attempts at getting them to spend time on issues which they consid-
ered to be our responsibility, and irrelevant for their take on the project. In 
point of fact, I now think their significant-rich understanding of our linguisti-
cally expressed agreement on the need for establishing a common ground was 
much closer to what we as researchers saw as a ‘division-of-labour’-approach 
than to what we meant. I think the common ground they found it necessary to 
establish was the propositionally expressed one we could agree upon in the 
meetings, coupled with a few guided tours around firm headquarters so that 
we researchers could ‘see what was going on’. The general concern to be 
drawn from this case is the fifth implementation problem: Initial perspectives 
may vary considerably as to what phrases such as ‘mutual apprenticeship’ 
and ‘the need for intertwining of ‘knowledge in practice’’ refer to. Establish-
ing a common understanding hereof is itself a ‘knowledge in practice’ prob-
lem which may constitute a barrier to pursuing Eikeland’s strategy.  
A variant of the ‘mutual apprenticeship’ strategy is found in the approach 
of the many action researchers who have a background as practitioners within 
a profession (Reason & Marshall, 2001). Getting an education as researcher 
after working several years in practice means intertwining action practice 
‘knowledge in practice’ with research ‘knowledge in practice’ in the opposite 
direction to the one Eikeland focuses on. This has the obvious advantage that 
the researcher has ‘knowledge in practice’ within the action practice from the 
beginning. However, such researchers (termed ‘practitioner-researchers’ in 
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the following) will have the problem of the practitioner sketched above: Their 
significant-rich understanding of practice will have taken form and content 
from one specific position among many relevant ones and there may well be 
‘blind spots’ which they, qua their prior insider-perspective on the action 
practice, are not able to see. An illustrative example is inadvertently supplied 
by Benner in her report of the words of an expert nurse: “When I say to a 
doctor, ‘the patient is psychotic’, I don’t always know how to legitimise the 
statement. But I am never wrong. Because I know psychosis from inside out. 
And I feel that, and I know it, and I trust it.” (Benner, 1984, p. 32). Benner 
who is a nurse practitioner-researcher analyses this statement as a case of 
intuitive expertise on the part of the nurse, and indeed it may be. Alternative-
ly, Rolf argues that ‘psychosis’ is a problematic category used to label non-
conforming persons (Rolf, 1991). The fact that Benner doesn’t consider this 
interpretation is a possible blind spot on her part. 
A further problem for practitioner-researchers is that other practitioners 
will tend to see them as practitioners. This will influence the interaction 
between researcher and practitioner. On the one hand, with some practition-
ers, it may aid the establishment of a trustful atmosphere, and let the re-
searcher have access to information and points of view which would not 
otherwise have been disclosed to her. But on the other hand, it may also make 
it difficult for the researcher to fulfil her role as researcher. It may for exam-
ple be awkward to ask about procedures or opinions which she, qua practi-
tioner, is expected to know about already3. It should be noted that even 
researchers who are not former practitioners may experience these problems, 
to the extent that they progressively become engaged in the action practice 
and develop ‘knowledge in practice’. Progressive entanglement in practice 
will make it increasingly difficult to take a critical and radically innovative 
stance on practice. 
                                           
3  Thrysøe and Dohn report on similar advantages and problems from their studies of 
nursing students’ transition to newly qualified nurses and creation of situational inter-
est in biology lessons, respectively. These studies were not action research projects, 
but the methodological issues are the same as regards the way practitioners treat for-
mer practitioners who are now researchers. Being themselves a nurse and a biology 
teacher, respectively, they were expected to act like ones, not to take on the researcher 
role (Dohn, 2006; Thrysøe, 2011).  
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A third strategy, between the end poles of ‘division of labour’ and ‘mutual 
apprenticeship’, is the co-operative inquiry approach described by Heron and 
Reason (Heron & Reason, 2001) and exemplified in a number of case studies 
(e.g. Baldwin, 2001; Heron, 2001; Hills, 2001; Reason, 1988; Weil, 
Bhandari, & Shah, 2002). The baseline of this approach is that a group of 
people join together to formulate a common project within an area of human 
activity. A group may consist of practitioners who work in the same 
field/within the same profession but in different practices (usually because 
they are employed by different institutions/organisations). Other examples 
include families investigating new styles of living, and ill people investigat-
ing a particular healing practice (Heron & Reason, 2001). Research is done in 
cycles of reflection and action, where the participants are all both co-
researchers and co-subjects, engaging in the actions which they agree upon in 
the reflective sessions. As described by Heron and Reason, co-operative 
inquiry may be very diverse in length depending on the question explored, 
ranging from short workshops (with several cycles of reflection and action 
taking place during the workshop) to yearlong projects. Co-operative inquiry 
may be started either by initiating researchers who choose a topic, invite 
others to participate, and initiate them into the method; or by ‘bootstrapping’ 
groups who read about the method in the literature and embark on the inquiry 
process together, without being joined by accredited academic researchers 
(Heron & Reason, 2001). 
What differentiates this approach from the ones discussed above, as con-
cerns the issue of intertwinement of ‘knowledge in practice’, is that the co-
researchers typically do not come from the same action practice, but from 
ones which are similar enough for them to have a wealth of personal and 
practical experiences to draw on to give significant-rich meaning to their 
conversations. They can thus function as a reflective critique group: They 
have enough ‘knowledge in practice’ in common with each other to under-
stand the nuances of what is being said, but at the same time, since they are 
not participants in each other’s practices, they may from their insider-to-
other-practices view see some of the blind spots of the others. 
As a way of developing practices, co-operative inquiry seems ideal: It has 
the same advantages as Eikeland’s approach, namely that an insider-to-other-
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practices acquires enough understanding of a given action practice, in this 
case through the common resonance of tacit aspects of ‘knowledge in prac-
tice’ between practitioners in different practices, to provide insightful prac-
tice-developing suggestions. But it does not require the lengthy and resource-
demanding process of ‘mutual apprenticeship’ and therefore presumably is 
more realistic to acquire funding for.  
However, as a way of researching the development of practices, co-
operative inquiry shares the problems of the ‘division of labour’ approach: If 
the inquiry is undertaken by a bootstrapping group without anyone actually 
trained as an academic researcher, the group will have only the propositional 
knowledge of the literature to go by. They will not have research ‘knowledge 
in practice’ and thus will not have the feel for how to ask, pursue and answer 
research questions related to the development of their practices, nor will they 
have the feel for when, where and how to report on their research. If under-
taken together with academic researchers, co-operative inquiry is, as regards 
the research venture, in effect an example of the ‘division of labour’ ap-
proach: Since the co-researchers only meet for sessions of reflection, the 
academic researchers only share propositional knowledge with the co-
researchers. Therefore, no tacit common ground of experience is established, 
and no intertwinement of ‘knowledge in practice’ ensues. 
5. In conclusion 
In this article, I have sought to clarify the ontology of knowledge, including 
the relationship which different forms of knowledge have to each other, and 
to point out the methodological implications hereof for action research. I was 
motivated to take up this issue by the tendencies within action research to 
either subsume in practice all forms of knowledge under propositional 
knowledge, or to distinguish them so much from one another that there 
seemed to be no relation between them at all. The methodological problems 
ensuing from these tendencies underscore the necessity of becoming clearer 
about what knowledge is. 
More specifically, I have supplied an analysis of the knowledge we have 
as insiders-to-a-practice. I have stressed that we are always insiders-to-some-
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practices so that we do not approach a new practice as outsiders-to-the-
practice, but rather as insiders-to-others. The ontology of knowledge, I have 
argued, is a holistic unity of three knowledge aspects: personal experience 
(know of), practical knowing (know how) and propositional knowledge 
(know that). These aspects have distinct ontological realisations as, respec-
tively, a bodily responsiveness, an embodied understanding in the doing 
itself, and linguistic representation. They are thus not reducible to one anoth-
er. They do, however, interrelate and supply meaning to one another. The 
former two constitute a resonance field of meaning, which supplies tacit 
significance-rich semantic content necessary for the full understanding of the 
words of the latter. Propositional knowledge in turn provides a possibility of 
interpretation, (re-)direction and transformation of the other two. Their unity, 
which I term ‘knowledge in practice’, forms an action-oriented perspective 
on the situation. This perspective supplies significance-structuring to the 
situation and lets traits within it stand out as traits – and as traits with an 
immediate actionable significance. 
The methodological implications for action research of this analysis of 
knowledge are that ‘knowledge in practice’ is essential for understanding 
practice, for providing adequate descriptions of it, for evaluating practical 
implications of critical comments, and for assessing the results of action 
research interventions. ‘Knowledge in practice’ is the basis upon which 
adequate interpretations are made: it is that with which one can answer 
Geertz’ validity questions and tell a better account from a worse one. If the 
action researcher wishes to be able to do so, she therefore needs to participate 
in the actual doings of the action practice in order to gain practical and expe-
riential knowledge and acquire enough of the ‘knowledge in practice’ per-
spective to allow her to understand practice and the changes she participates 
in bringing about. This will not do it alone, however, the perspective of 
research ‘knowledge in practice’ is necessary, too. What is called for is an 
intertwining of the ‘knowledge in practice’ pertaining to the two types of 
practice. And for the action research project to be a success, this intertwining 
must go both ways, i.e. the practitioners must ‘work their way’ into the 
research practice of the action researcher as well. Otherwise the risk is too 
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great that misunderstandings and failure ensue, as in the case described in the 
vignette. 
The requirement for intertwining of ‘knowledge in practice’ poses a seri-
ous quality issue for the many action research projects concerned with co-
constructing knowledge. Do they allow the participants enough time to 
engage in each other’s practices, learning ‘how to do’ them, for them to 
actually know what they are doing, or even understand what they are saying 
(in any depth)? Or do they restrict themselves to making verbal representa-
tions of the practices at meetings, thus not allowing the participants a signifi-
cant-rich understanding, neither of the project itself, nor of its progress and 
assessment?  
In the light of this issue, I have discussed three approaches to action re-
search which together give paradigmatic illustrations of the possibilities for 
researchers and practitioners to intertwine their ‘knowledge in practice’. The 
upshot of the discussion is that approaches such as Eikeland’s ‘mutual ap-
prenticeship’, exemplified in the work of Poonamallee, stand the best chances 
of meeting the quality issue implied by the analysis of ‘knowledge in prac-
tice’ because such approaches specifically emphasise the importance of 
participants actually partaking in each other’s practices. This is in contradis-
tinction to approaches which build on a ‘division of labour’ between re-
searcher and practitioners (exemplified by Genat’s participative action re-
search) or on the latter ‘bootstrapping’ themselves into research solely by 
reading about it (exemplified by the co-operative inquiry approach). 
Eikeland’s approach has organisational and methodological problems of its 
own, though: In concrete cases such as the one described in the vignette it 
may be difficult to convince managers, funding institutions, and even the 
participants themselves of the need for spending large amounts of time 
working in each other’s practices. On the other hand, progressive entangle-
ment in the action practice may make it increasingly hard for the researcher 
to take on her ‘insider-to-other-practices’ role. Effectively, she may become 
an ‘insider-to-this-practice’, on a par with the practitioners, and thus develop 
an insider-perspective adhering to one out of many possible positions in 
practice instead of an intertwined ‘knowledge in practice’ which draws on 
tacit dimensions from both researcher and action practice. In this way, the 
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analysis of ‘knowledge in practice’ poses a methodological quality issue for 
approaches like Eikeland’s, too. 
A final comment is apposite on the status of the claims presented in this 
article vis-a-vis the thesis that propositional knowledge without a resonance 
field of tacit dimensions is shallow. How can I hope to convince anyone by 
my words alone? The answer is I don’t. What I hope is that my reader’s own 
experiences with action research in practice will be brought to resonate by 
my words, thus enabling a significant-rich understanding of the propositions I 
have presented. It is on this ground that I think my arguments should be 
evaluated: not just for what they say narrowly speaking, but by the resonance 
of lived tensions and dilemmas they invoke. My hope is that my reader’s 
action-oriented ‘knowledge in practice’ perspective will let the explanation I 
provide for these tensions and dilemmas stand out as recognisable and rea-
sonable.4 
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